Scott Schoen started off by describing a simple structure for the fundamentals of PE.
The THL Perspective of Doing the Deal
Sourcing (involves valuations and generating deal flow for inside due diligence)
-> Financing (due diligence is key)
-> Operations (improvements are key)
-> Strategic Exits (options include secondary PE markets)
Inside due diligence consists of identifying the
level of control required of the target,
leverage for the deal,
operational value add opportunities.
Financing constructs considered include PIPE structures where the private equity firm can acquire control with about 30-% to 35% of equity without paying for control. Financing sources can be broken down into existing investors, the government, and Mergers & Acquisitions. Each of these requires various strategies to be in play.
Manifestations of the Current Economic Context
Scott Schoen’s key points about the manifestations of the current economic context:
Sizing the problem: The economic contraction is a function of leverage. It impacts US Financial Sector assets totaling $60 trillion on the US balance sheet, and also impacts the leverage ratio (40:1) of financial institutions. As an example, he pointed out that the total CLO transactions in Q4 2008 were $0.
Return to basics: The contraction will lead to companies looking for cost savings; however, one company’s cost savings are another company’s lost revenue. In terms of the private equity industry, this translates to a return to the basics- better covenants and refinancing of senior loans.
Restructuring: There are two ways to deal with distress scenarios. Either negotiate amendments when faced with defaults, or go into a court process as lenders are fragmented, with banks as senior lenders.
Rates and The PE Deal: New rates at LIBOR +2.5% to 8.5% are causing value to seep through the PE deal.
The Equity Overhang: The private equity industry equity overhang of $400 billion will likely go into mid market private equity transactions
LP Asset Allocation: Limited Partners have capital allocation challenges to deal with- these can be deduced from the equity overhang. A $10 billion fund that is allocating 5% in private equity needs $1 billion in investments as money comes back at a certain pace.
It would be interesting to evaluate the strategies that GPs, LPs and lenders are considering to find returns across the process. Given the willingness to consider PIPE transactions, would PE firms begin behaving like hedge funds to manage the huge equity overhang?
What do you think?
The Usual Disclaimer: This is purely a knowledge sharing resource and I have been careful to protect panelist/ speaker interests. Ethically, context is everything, and I will gladly retract anything that affects the parties mentioned. Call this my mini OpenCourseWare, if you will, where Open signifies life experiences.
Trends and Behavior. Random thoughts. Quick Scribbles.
Word. Play. "Bourne to be Wilde".
Ready, Steady, Go?
Showing posts with label limited partner. Show all posts
Showing posts with label limited partner. Show all posts
Saturday, April 04, 2009
Sunday, February 01, 2009
Panel: Venture Capital: “If it ain’t broke…” Does the VC Model Need Fixing?
The discussion focused on the parameters within which the VC industry currently operates
A return to fundamentals
The discussion kicked off with a return to fundamentals:
1> Most venture capital firms are not setup to make small investments
2> Venture capital firms are more like asset managers
3> Deal making is not easy: A deal like that of EqualLogic was hard work for all parties involved
4> The venture capital business is fundamentally not about fundamental research for revolutionary technologies, but about applying technology
5> Depending on the industry, the average holding period can be up to 9 years
6> As the market for the pre-IPO company matures, it should grow larger, providing the opportunity for late stage venture capital firms.
7> Exit strategies are critical to the model. Is there a vibrant IPO market? Are there private company sales opportunities?
Investing during the economic downturn
The panelist opinion was that the quality of business plans and management teams gets better as the economy goes down. The panelists emphasized that they are being extremely selective; they are not into throwing 50 bets at the solar power industry.
A panelist pointed out that the CEOs of their portfolio firms were upset by the Sequoia deck. The economic downturn, though, has led them to revisit their breakeven analysis.
Economic cycles and the industry- a perspective
A panelist had an interesting perspective on the economic downturn- the VC firm sells a company to Microsoft in the good times -> Microsoft cuts products and jobs in the bad times -> the resources are back in the VC fold working on the next product.
Venture Capital Fund Management
Funds are structured as financial managers who can find good business managers, as opposed to operational managers making funding decisions.
In January 2009, Kleiner Perkins, raised a so-called “annex fund,” or reserve fund it can tap to support companies it has already backed to help ensure they get through the downturn.
http://venturebeat.com/2009/01/14/kleiner-perkins-forced-to-reach-out-to-new-investors-unheard-of/
Outside of the one off hits, a panelist pointed out that returns in the 4x range would be rare in exits. Valuations were down 50%, B and C round valuations were down 20% and 30 % respectively. Another panelist stated that the venture capital industry was saved from a sever flight of capital by the buyout collapse.
Some the questions that arise:
1. Do lower valuations imply a longer time to complete transactions, and require a better understanding of the potential investment’s core business?
2. Would there be a shakeout in the industry that favors more late stage firms that have strong networks with large, potentially private companies? Would the shakeout lead to a reduction of the number of multistage firms?
3. Would late stage venture capital firms resort to private investment in public equity (small cap companies)? Even at the risk of serious strategy drift?
4. Given the odds of hitting the ball out of the ballpark (and I am not even talking about the odds of innovation), how should a venture capital firm get more selective?
5. Given the context of the Kleiner Perkins Annex fund, would a fund consider trading extensively in a secondary private market only when it is considering liquidating? Would partial portfolio/ strip sales be a serious option? Would some sort of a CDO like market structure be useful in the venture capital industry?
6. How are funds helping the LPs? Is it just via managing the drawdowns?
7. Are more LPs checking on estimates on deal flow and deal sizes to assess the impact of the economic downturn?
8. Are investment charters of old portfolios being modified to provide more flexibility to the venture capital firms?
9. How frequently are LPs assessing their asset allocations strategies and communicating with funds to execute revisions?
What do you think?
The Usual Disclaimer: This is purely a knowledge sharing resource and I have been careful to protect panelist/ speaker interests. Ethically, context is everything, and I will gladly retract anything that affects the parties mentioned. Call this my mini OpenCourseWare, if you will, where Open signifies life experiences.
A return to fundamentals
The discussion kicked off with a return to fundamentals:
1> Most venture capital firms are not setup to make small investments
2> Venture capital firms are more like asset managers
3> Deal making is not easy: A deal like that of EqualLogic was hard work for all parties involved
4> The venture capital business is fundamentally not about fundamental research for revolutionary technologies, but about applying technology
5> Depending on the industry, the average holding period can be up to 9 years
6> As the market for the pre-IPO company matures, it should grow larger, providing the opportunity for late stage venture capital firms.
7> Exit strategies are critical to the model. Is there a vibrant IPO market? Are there private company sales opportunities?
Investing during the economic downturn
The panelist opinion was that the quality of business plans and management teams gets better as the economy goes down. The panelists emphasized that they are being extremely selective; they are not into throwing 50 bets at the solar power industry.
A panelist pointed out that the CEOs of their portfolio firms were upset by the Sequoia deck. The economic downturn, though, has led them to revisit their breakeven analysis.
Economic cycles and the industry- a perspective
A panelist had an interesting perspective on the economic downturn- the VC firm sells a company to Microsoft in the good times -> Microsoft cuts products and jobs in the bad times -> the resources are back in the VC fold working on the next product.
Venture Capital Fund Management
Funds are structured as financial managers who can find good business managers, as opposed to operational managers making funding decisions.
In January 2009, Kleiner Perkins, raised a so-called “annex fund,” or reserve fund it can tap to support companies it has already backed to help ensure they get through the downturn.
http://venturebeat.com/2009/01/14/kleiner-perkins-forced-to-reach-out-to-new-investors-unheard-of/
Outside of the one off hits, a panelist pointed out that returns in the 4x range would be rare in exits. Valuations were down 50%, B and C round valuations were down 20% and 30 % respectively. Another panelist stated that the venture capital industry was saved from a sever flight of capital by the buyout collapse.
Some the questions that arise:
1. Do lower valuations imply a longer time to complete transactions, and require a better understanding of the potential investment’s core business?
2. Would there be a shakeout in the industry that favors more late stage firms that have strong networks with large, potentially private companies? Would the shakeout lead to a reduction of the number of multistage firms?
3. Would late stage venture capital firms resort to private investment in public equity (small cap companies)? Even at the risk of serious strategy drift?
4. Given the odds of hitting the ball out of the ballpark (and I am not even talking about the odds of innovation), how should a venture capital firm get more selective?
5. Given the context of the Kleiner Perkins Annex fund, would a fund consider trading extensively in a secondary private market only when it is considering liquidating? Would partial portfolio/ strip sales be a serious option? Would some sort of a CDO like market structure be useful in the venture capital industry?
6. How are funds helping the LPs? Is it just via managing the drawdowns?
7. Are more LPs checking on estimates on deal flow and deal sizes to assess the impact of the economic downturn?
8. Are investment charters of old portfolios being modified to provide more flexibility to the venture capital firms?
9. How frequently are LPs assessing their asset allocations strategies and communicating with funds to execute revisions?
What do you think?
The Usual Disclaimer: This is purely a knowledge sharing resource and I have been careful to protect panelist/ speaker interests. Ethically, context is everything, and I will gladly retract anything that affects the parties mentioned. Call this my mini OpenCourseWare, if you will, where Open signifies life experiences.
Sunday, April 06, 2008
Conference Panel: Asset Allocation and Changing Times, the Limited Partner Perspective
I decided to check with a Limited Partner (LP) on the questions on deal size and frequency that I had thought about at this conference:
http://randomjunkyramblings.blogspot.com/2008/03/conference-panel-investing-in-india.html
Of course, the context was different, but my take was that the issues encountered were the same. The LP smiled and said they had a great CFO. Going back to the Gary Loveman post below, you can't argue with talent:
http://randomjunkyramblings.blogspot.com/2008/04/conference-panel-portfolio-value.html
A General Partner (GP) at another panel said that an LP had mentioned that a lesser return in the depressed economic environment would still validate their investment/ asset allocation. It would be interesting to get insights into the aggregated decisions made by GPs across PE firms and the outcomes down the line.
The Usual Disclaimer: This is purely a knowledge sharing resource and I have been careful to protect panelist interests. Ethically, context is everything, and I will gladly retract anything that affects the parties mentioned. Call this my mini OpenCourseWare, if you will, where Open signifies life experiences.
http://randomjunkyramblings.blogspot.com/2008/03/conference-panel-investing-in-india.html
Of course, the context was different, but my take was that the issues encountered were the same. The LP smiled and said they had a great CFO. Going back to the Gary Loveman post below, you can't argue with talent:
http://randomjunkyramblings.blogspot.com/2008/04/conference-panel-portfolio-value.html
A General Partner (GP) at another panel said that an LP had mentioned that a lesser return in the depressed economic environment would still validate their investment/ asset allocation. It would be interesting to get insights into the aggregated decisions made by GPs across PE firms and the outcomes down the line.
The Usual Disclaimer: This is purely a knowledge sharing resource and I have been careful to protect panelist interests. Ethically, context is everything, and I will gladly retract anything that affects the parties mentioned. Call this my mini OpenCourseWare, if you will, where Open signifies life experiences.
Labels:
allocation,
asset,
cash,
deal,
frequency,
gary loveman,
general partner,
Investment,
limited partner,
private equity,
size
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)