I attended an Indian Classical & Fusion concert at Carnegie Hall earlier this year. A review of a concert in the series can be found here:
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/01/arts/music/01huss.html
My reaction to the concert: I was blown away.
I will admit to being a little starved of good classical performances of any sort for while, let alone live Indian classical. For someone with an untrained ear, I was really counting on flashes of brilliance from the performers to (re)capture my interest. A bit like a how an impossible volley at a crazy angle reminds you how much fun watching a Wimbledon final can be. Based on the names performing, I knew there would be at least a few flashes of brilliance.
The concert was all brilliance AND class. It was like being touched by God. It displayed Masters on top of their game, completely immersed, and reveling, in their trade. It was humbling, as all great displays of skill are, but I felt more like a wide eyed kid in a candy store.
The power of music! The patterns within a musical piece! The patterns within the music of the individual performers! The story that the interplay of instruments in a piece tell you and the story that a sequence of pieces tell you! Wow!
Like a little piece of art you like a little more than others, it even found a little bit of me to connect with. All this coming from an ear as untrained as mine.
I blame it all on the performers.
My jaw still drops (scrapes the floor, really) every time I think about the evening.
Thursday, April 30, 2009
Sunday, April 05, 2009
Is Private Equity The American Industry that protects American Enterprise?
Here’s a potential title for future historians to consider for the Private Equity industry in this decade:
Flush with liquidity, which you could call a “Greenspan Blessing”, the Private Equity industry, a truly American Industry, invested over a trillion dollars into American enterprises that were/ are strategic players in their industries, protecting them from a future downturn that would make many vulnerable to hostile takeovers from international buyers.
My thoughts went down this path thanks to a question posed by David Rubenstein from the Carlyle Group.
While lobbyists in D.C. would be salivating at this spin- the idea behind the headline is to answer David's question on the Private Equity industry's place in the economy.
I have an answer that's more an essay, however, I am sharing below some questions that I structured to effectively, and comprehensively answer David's question. Hope this helps you in understanding the Private Equity industry better.
Back to our headline- does it really make sense?
1> Would America’s rebound from the downturn have to lag that of other economies (discounting the opportunities for Brazilian, Chinese and Indian companies) for this to even be a potential story?
2> Can we prove the industry’s deal making and execution can have this unintended, headline making, consequence?
3> Could this unintended consequence have happened as an explicit strategy to protect, store and manage American value? Would this strategy have worked if it were run by the American government?
4> Given America’s history and promise as the land of reinvention and rejuvenation, does this unintended consequence or strategy make sense? Specifically, why save and protect when failure makes you better and stronger?
5> Or couldit truly be an example of reinvention and rejuvenation?
6> Can the Private Equity industry even be called a truly American industry? Could we truly say "Only in America!"?
How would this trend of over a trillion dollars in Private Equity investment have worked out during the 1981-82 recessions? Are the market structures today substantially different than they were in 1981 for the comparison to be odious?
While I have an opinion and can weave a story…
What do you think?
Flush with liquidity, which you could call a “Greenspan Blessing”, the Private Equity industry, a truly American Industry, invested over a trillion dollars into American enterprises that were/ are strategic players in their industries, protecting them from a future downturn that would make many vulnerable to hostile takeovers from international buyers.
My thoughts went down this path thanks to a question posed by David Rubenstein from the Carlyle Group.
While lobbyists in D.C. would be salivating at this spin- the idea behind the headline is to answer David's question on the Private Equity industry's place in the economy.
I have an answer that's more an essay, however, I am sharing below some questions that I structured to effectively, and comprehensively answer David's question. Hope this helps you in understanding the Private Equity industry better.
Back to our headline- does it really make sense?
1> Would America’s rebound from the downturn have to lag that of other economies (discounting the opportunities for Brazilian, Chinese and Indian companies) for this to even be a potential story?
2> Can we prove the industry’s deal making and execution can have this unintended, headline making, consequence?
3> Could this unintended consequence have happened as an explicit strategy to protect, store and manage American value? Would this strategy have worked if it were run by the American government?
4> Given America’s history and promise as the land of reinvention and rejuvenation, does this unintended consequence or strategy make sense? Specifically, why save and protect when failure makes you better and stronger?
5> Or couldit truly be an example of reinvention and rejuvenation?
6> Can the Private Equity industry even be called a truly American industry? Could we truly say "Only in America!"?
How would this trend of over a trillion dollars in Private Equity investment have worked out during the 1981-82 recessions? Are the market structures today substantially different than they were in 1981 for the comparison to be odious?
While I have an opinion and can weave a story…
What do you think?
Private Equity Firms and Large Company Acquisitions
Richard Friedman’s key factors for Private Equity funds targeting large companies- financing, downturn lag effects and compensation limits on management, listed here
http://randomjunkyramblings.blogspot.com/2009/03/6-private-equity-firms-and-large.html
- lead to a host of follow up questions.
Are the public capital markets more imperfect than perfect at corporate governance? In more cases than not, have capital markets been reduced to purely reflecting the underperformer reality of a large company as opposed to packing the bite that enforces change? Fragmented ownership is a factor. But is that it? There are numerous cases of an activist investors that have not met their primary objectives (I am not talking about activist investors whose primary objective is greenmail).
If we look at Friedman’s 3 points, and buy the fact that no team can consistently beat economic headwinds to provide massively outperforming returns, would you call private equity firms spectacular market timers? Gives you a simple screen- find a lag effect, and find a management team that’s already furiously at work to beat it, incentivize it to keep the boat steady, and voila! outperformer returns!
Consistent market timing? Really? A simple screen provides outperformer returns? Consistently?
Now, running a large enterprise that is suffering lag effects of a downturn takes some skill. At the simplest level, the private equity investor can certainly simulate an activist investor and provide senior management the backing it needs to rechannel energies from quarter to quarter window dressing into initiative that dovetail with the exit time frame. The private equity takeover can function as the step change that galvanizes the organization into focusing, even functioning as a hedgehog focused on a target.
Even these “operational improvements” count on:
existing management’s ability to direct, or shake up, existing relationships, or,
the investor’s ability to bring in people that can achieve the investor’s objectives.
Contingent upon incentives working, once the deal is struck, execution patterns and outcomes similar to Post Merger Integration efforts should dominate.
Stepping back, what are the patterns and markers that a private equity investor can use to manipulate the trade offs across financing, directed human capital (read operational improvements), and macroeconomic conditions to achieve outperformer returns?
The question’s underlying axiom is obvious; it is possible, with some consistency, to provider outperformer returns. You now also have a rudimentary structure (dare I say a quant model? :-)) to value the impact of these three components on final returns.
What do you think?
The Usual Disclaimer: This is purely a knowledge sharing resource and I have been careful to protect panelist interests. Ethically, context is everything, and I will gladly retract anything that affects the parties mentioned. Call this my mini OpenCourseWare, if you will, where Open signifies life experiences.
http://randomjunkyramblings.blogspot.com/2009/03/6-private-equity-firms-and-large.html
- lead to a host of follow up questions.
Are the public capital markets more imperfect than perfect at corporate governance? In more cases than not, have capital markets been reduced to purely reflecting the underperformer reality of a large company as opposed to packing the bite that enforces change? Fragmented ownership is a factor. But is that it? There are numerous cases of an activist investors that have not met their primary objectives (I am not talking about activist investors whose primary objective is greenmail).
If we look at Friedman’s 3 points, and buy the fact that no team can consistently beat economic headwinds to provide massively outperforming returns, would you call private equity firms spectacular market timers? Gives you a simple screen- find a lag effect, and find a management team that’s already furiously at work to beat it, incentivize it to keep the boat steady, and voila! outperformer returns!
Consistent market timing? Really? A simple screen provides outperformer returns? Consistently?
Now, running a large enterprise that is suffering lag effects of a downturn takes some skill. At the simplest level, the private equity investor can certainly simulate an activist investor and provide senior management the backing it needs to rechannel energies from quarter to quarter window dressing into initiative that dovetail with the exit time frame. The private equity takeover can function as the step change that galvanizes the organization into focusing, even functioning as a hedgehog focused on a target.
Even these “operational improvements” count on:
existing management’s ability to direct, or shake up, existing relationships, or,
the investor’s ability to bring in people that can achieve the investor’s objectives.
Contingent upon incentives working, once the deal is struck, execution patterns and outcomes similar to Post Merger Integration efforts should dominate.
Stepping back, what are the patterns and markers that a private equity investor can use to manipulate the trade offs across financing, directed human capital (read operational improvements), and macroeconomic conditions to achieve outperformer returns?
The question’s underlying axiom is obvious; it is possible, with some consistency, to provider outperformer returns. You now also have a rudimentary structure (dare I say a quant model? :-)) to value the impact of these three components on final returns.
What do you think?
The Usual Disclaimer: This is purely a knowledge sharing resource and I have been careful to protect panelist interests. Ethically, context is everything, and I will gladly retract anything that affects the parties mentioned. Call this my mini OpenCourseWare, if you will, where Open signifies life experiences.
Saturday, April 04, 2009
Panel: Creating Value through Operational Improvements
The panel discussion kick-off reminded me of a simple brand equity value chain, noted below in a slightly modified manner: look at the market for size and value, and work your way inward into the organization into the capital structure, evaluating improvements at each step.
To tackle the question of creating value in the current economic context, the panelists considered various tactics like evaluating the purchasing power of the customer, to benchmarking various activities of the organization. This can lead to evaluating options like changes to distribution strategy, or even product rationalization.
A Managing Director at Fenway Partners, who has been through the 2001-02 downturn, pointed out that you may save capital, but you are then faced with the challenge of deploying it.
He ventured three capital deployment options- buy debt at a discount, invest in organic growth by looking at operational investments, and invest in equity acquisitions. Investcorp’s analysis on operational improvements making an impact on exit multiples/ firm value fits into this decision making process.
Some questions I considered coming out of the panel:
Growth: Depending on the nature of the industry, and the cash at hand, what would encourage companies to pursue market share growth as a strategy? How are companies allocating resources to strategies that have a longer incubation time for results?
Risk Taking: How are companies deciding on change management risks in the current economic context?
Know Thy Customer: Given that customer segmentation is expected to lead to actionable marketing activities, how would it change in the changed economic context? While investing in understanding the customer may take a hit, how are companies evaluating situations where cutbacks here will hurt more than add value?
One Chart, One Slide to Show It All
Taking these questions and thoughts further, you really come to a simple X-Y bubble chart that lists points in the company’s value chain starting from financing to customer touch points on one scale, and profitability of investments on another, with bubble size being a function of risk.
Corporate Finance: A Decision Making Template
The decision making template behind this evaluation process could be:
1. What is the customer impact? One parameter to consider could be- would this improve customer “stick”? This helps evaluate customer acquistion programs, given that margins are under pressure and most companies are looking to increase volumes.
2. Do we have cash for change?
3. What is the profitability *profile* of each investment? E.g. Do certain improvements investments have "long tail" returns?
4. What is the exit strategy for this change project?
What do you think?
The Usual Disclaimer: This is purely a knowledge sharing resource and I have been careful to protect panelist/ speaker interests. Ethically, context is everything, and I will gladly retract anything that affects the parties mentioned. Call this my mini OpenCourseWare, if you will, where Open signifies life experiences.
To tackle the question of creating value in the current economic context, the panelists considered various tactics like evaluating the purchasing power of the customer, to benchmarking various activities of the organization. This can lead to evaluating options like changes to distribution strategy, or even product rationalization.
A Managing Director at Fenway Partners, who has been through the 2001-02 downturn, pointed out that you may save capital, but you are then faced with the challenge of deploying it.
He ventured three capital deployment options- buy debt at a discount, invest in organic growth by looking at operational investments, and invest in equity acquisitions. Investcorp’s analysis on operational improvements making an impact on exit multiples/ firm value fits into this decision making process.
Some questions I considered coming out of the panel:
Growth: Depending on the nature of the industry, and the cash at hand, what would encourage companies to pursue market share growth as a strategy? How are companies allocating resources to strategies that have a longer incubation time for results?
Risk Taking: How are companies deciding on change management risks in the current economic context?
Know Thy Customer: Given that customer segmentation is expected to lead to actionable marketing activities, how would it change in the changed economic context? While investing in understanding the customer may take a hit, how are companies evaluating situations where cutbacks here will hurt more than add value?
One Chart, One Slide to Show It All
Taking these questions and thoughts further, you really come to a simple X-Y bubble chart that lists points in the company’s value chain starting from financing to customer touch points on one scale, and profitability of investments on another, with bubble size being a function of risk.
Corporate Finance: A Decision Making Template
The decision making template behind this evaluation process could be:
1. What is the customer impact? One parameter to consider could be- would this improve customer “stick”? This helps evaluate customer acquistion programs, given that margins are under pressure and most companies are looking to increase volumes.
2. Do we have cash for change?
3. What is the profitability *profile* of each investment? E.g. Do certain improvements investments have "long tail" returns?
4. What is the exit strategy for this change project?
What do you think?
The Usual Disclaimer: This is purely a knowledge sharing resource and I have been careful to protect panelist/ speaker interests. Ethically, context is everything, and I will gladly retract anything that affects the parties mentioned. Call this my mini OpenCourseWare, if you will, where Open signifies life experiences.
On Private Equity: Scott Schoen, THL
Scott Schoen started off by describing a simple structure for the fundamentals of PE.
The THL Perspective of Doing the Deal
Sourcing (involves valuations and generating deal flow for inside due diligence)
-> Financing (due diligence is key)
-> Operations (improvements are key)
-> Strategic Exits (options include secondary PE markets)
Inside due diligence consists of identifying the
level of control required of the target,
leverage for the deal,
operational value add opportunities.
Financing constructs considered include PIPE structures where the private equity firm can acquire control with about 30-% to 35% of equity without paying for control. Financing sources can be broken down into existing investors, the government, and Mergers & Acquisitions. Each of these requires various strategies to be in play.
Manifestations of the Current Economic Context
Scott Schoen’s key points about the manifestations of the current economic context:
Sizing the problem: The economic contraction is a function of leverage. It impacts US Financial Sector assets totaling $60 trillion on the US balance sheet, and also impacts the leverage ratio (40:1) of financial institutions. As an example, he pointed out that the total CLO transactions in Q4 2008 were $0.
Return to basics: The contraction will lead to companies looking for cost savings; however, one company’s cost savings are another company’s lost revenue. In terms of the private equity industry, this translates to a return to the basics- better covenants and refinancing of senior loans.
Restructuring: There are two ways to deal with distress scenarios. Either negotiate amendments when faced with defaults, or go into a court process as lenders are fragmented, with banks as senior lenders.
Rates and The PE Deal: New rates at LIBOR +2.5% to 8.5% are causing value to seep through the PE deal.
The Equity Overhang: The private equity industry equity overhang of $400 billion will likely go into mid market private equity transactions
LP Asset Allocation: Limited Partners have capital allocation challenges to deal with- these can be deduced from the equity overhang. A $10 billion fund that is allocating 5% in private equity needs $1 billion in investments as money comes back at a certain pace.
It would be interesting to evaluate the strategies that GPs, LPs and lenders are considering to find returns across the process. Given the willingness to consider PIPE transactions, would PE firms begin behaving like hedge funds to manage the huge equity overhang?
What do you think?
The Usual Disclaimer: This is purely a knowledge sharing resource and I have been careful to protect panelist/ speaker interests. Ethically, context is everything, and I will gladly retract anything that affects the parties mentioned. Call this my mini OpenCourseWare, if you will, where Open signifies life experiences.
The THL Perspective of Doing the Deal
Sourcing (involves valuations and generating deal flow for inside due diligence)
-> Financing (due diligence is key)
-> Operations (improvements are key)
-> Strategic Exits (options include secondary PE markets)
Inside due diligence consists of identifying the
level of control required of the target,
leverage for the deal,
operational value add opportunities.
Financing constructs considered include PIPE structures where the private equity firm can acquire control with about 30-% to 35% of equity without paying for control. Financing sources can be broken down into existing investors, the government, and Mergers & Acquisitions. Each of these requires various strategies to be in play.
Manifestations of the Current Economic Context
Scott Schoen’s key points about the manifestations of the current economic context:
Sizing the problem: The economic contraction is a function of leverage. It impacts US Financial Sector assets totaling $60 trillion on the US balance sheet, and also impacts the leverage ratio (40:1) of financial institutions. As an example, he pointed out that the total CLO transactions in Q4 2008 were $0.
Return to basics: The contraction will lead to companies looking for cost savings; however, one company’s cost savings are another company’s lost revenue. In terms of the private equity industry, this translates to a return to the basics- better covenants and refinancing of senior loans.
Restructuring: There are two ways to deal with distress scenarios. Either negotiate amendments when faced with defaults, or go into a court process as lenders are fragmented, with banks as senior lenders.
Rates and The PE Deal: New rates at LIBOR +2.5% to 8.5% are causing value to seep through the PE deal.
The Equity Overhang: The private equity industry equity overhang of $400 billion will likely go into mid market private equity transactions
LP Asset Allocation: Limited Partners have capital allocation challenges to deal with- these can be deduced from the equity overhang. A $10 billion fund that is allocating 5% in private equity needs $1 billion in investments as money comes back at a certain pace.
It would be interesting to evaluate the strategies that GPs, LPs and lenders are considering to find returns across the process. Given the willingness to consider PIPE transactions, would PE firms begin behaving like hedge funds to manage the huge equity overhang?
What do you think?
The Usual Disclaimer: This is purely a knowledge sharing resource and I have been careful to protect panelist/ speaker interests. Ethically, context is everything, and I will gladly retract anything that affects the parties mentioned. Call this my mini OpenCourseWare, if you will, where Open signifies life experiences.
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